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I. INTRODUCTION
THE 747 captain turned his ship onto the departure
runway at Tenerife and began the takeoff roll. Unbeknownst to him, another 747 was taxiing in the mist down
the runway. The planes collided at 150 miles per hour.
Five hundred and seventy-seven people died.'
Although the causes of serious aviation incidents take
many forms, the foremost cause is pilot negligence. A pilot may, for example, ignore regulations or fail to exercise
due care. Sometimes, however, there is no lack of care,
but rather a lapse in judgment or a separate instrumentality that causes the pilot to err. Nevertheless, pilot negligence, while not the only cause, is a significant
contributor to aviation accidents.
General aviation encompasses a great diversity of pilots, aircraft, and operations. Therefore, issues of aviation safety cannot focus entirely on large aircraft and
revenue carriers. Moreover, as in other endeavors, negligence law seeks to enhance safety in general aviation.
The variety of aviation issues and the role of tort law in
improving safety, in general, requires a close scrutiny of
the interaction between general aviation and pilot negligence law.
Consequently, the concept of pilot negligence should
'James Reason, The Psychopathology of Everyday Slips,
1984, at 45.
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be revised to integrate the tenets of flying and flight
safety. General aviation is now a large and mature enterprise, but development of aviation law demonstrates that
courts lack the basic understanding of the fundamentals
of aviation and their proper application to pilot liability.
One important issue involves how the law of negligence
influences pilots to maintain high levels of safety to avoid
injury. Law may accomplish this goal through principles
of psychology. If pilot negligence law, by design, appropriately distributes liability in aircraft accident litigation,
and pilots recognize the distribution as equitable, then pilots attribute blameworthiness to certain conduct, and
consequently avoid that conduct. Thus, it is worthwhile
to evaluate how well certain aspects of present negligence
law define the bases of pilot liability. These aspects include negligence per se, the negligence standard of care,
liability for pilot mistakes and poor judgment that are not
negligent, res ipsa loquitur, and statutory aviation strict
liability.
The attribution theory of psychology is a link between
pilots and negligence law that may enhance flight safety.
The cornerstone of the theory is that a person attributes
responsibility for an outcome to a preceding event when
2
the person discerns a causal connection between the two.
The whole of a person's past experience and attitudes affects the way the person makes attributions.' In the realm
of pilot negligence, the event is some action or omission
by the pilot of the accident aircraft, and the outcome is
legal liability. If the attributor is a pilot, then expertise in
aviation colors the attribution. Hence, if pilot negligence
law imposes liability in a manner consistent with pilots'
views of aviation, then negligence law reinforces safetyoriented attitudes of pilots.
Jos Jaspers, Attribution Theory and Research: The State of the Art, in ATrRIBUTION
3,
4 (Jos Jaspers et al. eds., 1983).
1 Icek Azjen & Martin Fishbein, Relevance andAvailability in the Attribution Process,
in ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 63, 69 (Jos Jaspers et al. eds., 1983).
2

THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
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Because some of pilots' safety attitudes derive from aviation regulation, a study of pilot negligence law must address negligence per se.
The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) addresses safety issues in two ways.
First, the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) promulgated by the FAA to address, among other things, safety
issues are regulatory and demand compliance. 4 Documentary safety literature published by the FAA in the Airman's Information Manual (AIM) explains to pilots the
application of FARs in various situations. In addition,
supplementary advisory circulars provide valuable information on safety. 5 All of these documents require consideration under pilot negligence law.
When the FARs are not applicable to a situation, the
law must judge a pilot's actions based on a second aspect
of negligence law: the generalized standard of care. Flying is a very specialized activity, and the standard of care
for pilots should reflect this fact. The generic standard of
care, however, contains no informed definitions of the
care or expertise required for the proper operation of air
vehicles. A plethora of data, though, is available regarding aircraft accidents and their causes.6 Lessons learned
from past accidents are beneficial to fashioning a proper
standard of care in pilot negligence law.
Pilot negligence law must also recognize that pilot negligence is not the sole cause of all aircraft accidents.
Although pilot mistakes and poor judgment may cause
aircraft accidents, this type of human error does not constitute negligent behavior. Nonetheless, if a pilot has
been negligent in causing a mistake, then reducing the
negligent conduct enhances aviation safety. Specifically,
there may be pilots other than the accident aircraft pilot
who could be legally responsible for the mistake in question. Thus, pilot negligence law must also address these
individuals.
4
5

Wood v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,821, 17,823 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982).

6 See, e.g., NTSB ANNUAL REVIEW OF ACCIDENT DATA (published annually).
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An additional aspect of negligence law that bears on pilot liability is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Certainly, res
ipsa loquitur is applied in American negligence law because
it is quite useful. General aviation, however, is a special
form of human endeavor, and it requires properly tailored
legal rules. Here, the issue is whether res ipsa loquitur, a
general negligence rule, has a role in the special category
of pilot negligence. As with the pilot's standard of care,
past aircraft accidents provide the answer.
Finally, the law relating to pilot's actions must address
the issue of aviation strict liability. The early history of
aviation law still affects present pilot negligence law. At
the same time, technology and necessity have changed the
nature of flying. Hence, legal attitudes toward flying that
are half a century old are now vestigial. It is time to decide whether to condemn those attitudes to history.
In all, many facets of pilot negligence law may benefit
from an educated overhaul. The initial step is to gather
the tools for the job, beginning with a hypothesis to form
a bridge between pilot negligence law and greater flight
safety. When combined with data regarding past aircraft
accidents, such a hypothesis will provide a useful evaluation of the various bases for pilot liability.
II.

HYPOTHESIS: IF NEGLIGENCE LAW CLOSELY
PARALLELS SKILLED PILOTS' VIEWS OF
AVIATION, THEN NEGLIGENCE
LAW ENHANCES AVIATION
SAFETY
If aviation negligence law accurately conforms to the
nature and diversity of general aviation, then the law induces pilots to be safe. The basis of this principle is that
all aircraft accidents are traceable to some form of human
error. Therefore, all accidents are avoidable if human error is removed. As Tom Wolfe stated, "[tihere are no accidents and no fatal flaws in the machines; there are only

1094 JOURNAL OF AIR LAWAND COMMERCE
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pilots with the wrong stuff."' 7 Aviation law can diminish
pilot error by using psychological attribution theory to
make pilots aware that they are the source of human error, and therefore, they can control and eliminate the error. Specifically, the theory appeals to the attributional
functions of control, self-esteem, and self-presentation in
pilots.' Negligence law tailored to these functions may induce safe and nonerroneous conduct.
Generally, attribution theory suggests that an individual's perceptions of the causal relations between events
and their effects influences how that individual adjusts behavior to achieve desired results. In particular, an individual perceives effects as being modifiable if the individual
sees the triggering event as emanating from the individual's personal free will. 9 Each perceived event adds information to an individual's beliefs. These personal beliefs
are internally consistent within the individual, and the individual revises beliefs in an orderly fashion upon the receipt of new attributional information.'" Thus, the world
surrounding an individual influences the individual's
behavior.
Personal attributions manifest themselves through
three functions that maintain an individual's positive selfperception, and each has an application to pilots. First,
the control function posits that an individual has a basic
motivation to exert control over the physical and social
world around him or her." By perceiving a link between
an event and its results, an individual attributes the result
to the event. Although an individual may attribute a result to either a person or surrounding circumstances, a
personal attribution is more likely than a situational attri27 (1979).
Miles Hewstone, Attribution Theory and Common-Sense Explanations: An Introductory Overview, in ATTRIBUTION THEORY 1, 17 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
9 John Monohan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719,
721 (1973).
TOM WOLFE, THE RIGHT STUFF

10 Azjen & Fishbein, supra note 3, at 69.

11Hewstone, supra note 8, at 17.
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bution.' 2 Also, personal attributions are prevalent be' 3
cause persons are viewed as the "prototype of origins."'
Further, people typically do not see chance as an attributional category.14 Thus, an individual's motivation to control is a motivation to create results by personal action
because causal actions originate in persons, and not in situations or chance.
If pilots perceive that they can control their liability,
then they have a motivation to do so. General aviation
pilots as a group already have a more internalized locus of
control than non-pilots.' 5 That is, pilots feel more personally responsible for their acts.' 6 If pilots, however,
perceive aviation negligence law as arbitrary and unrelated to flying, then pilots do not attribute liability to
themselves, but instead to situations or chance. On the
other hand, if the rules of aviation negligence law are rational, as perceived by pilots, then pilots attribute liability
to their own actions. Hence, pilot negligence law that relates closely to pilot perceptions of aviation increases
safety.
The second attributional function that affects pilots is
the self-esteem function. An individual is motivated to
protect the individual's self-impression.' 7 Thus, personal
success leads to positive feelings such as pride, and failure
leads to shame.' Overall, the self-esteem function leads
an individual to act in the individual's best interest.
The Health Belief Model illustrates the self-esteem
function at work. "The model postulates that an individual's decision to undertake health-related actions is governed by specific health beliefs: namely, the patient's
I2 Id.

at 3.

13 Id.
14 Gurnek Bains, Explanations and the Need for Control, in ATrRIBUTION THEORY
126, 129 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
15C.E. Melton, Human Error in Aviation: Deliberate, Inadvertent or Reflecting Exper-

tise, in BUSINESS AVIATION SAFETY 13 (1991).
16 Id.

Hewstone, supra note 8, at 17.
18J. Richard Eiser, From Attributions to Behaviour, in ATTRIBUTION THEORY 160,
17

165 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
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perceived vulnerability to, and perceived severity of, a
particular illness, and his or her perception of efficacy,
costs and benefits involved in the recommended health
action."' 9 The Health Belief Model is a method of analyzing a present situation, a future situation, and the costs
and benefits of the various paths between the two. For
instance, a patient with heart disease might face a choice
of undergoing a bypass operation, which encompasses the
risks of surgery and yet the prospects of a longer life. The
patient also has the option of doing nothing. Likewise,
actions that a person may take to reach a desired self-impression have different costs and benefits, though the goal
of better self-impression remains the same.
The Health Belief Model has an analogy in general aviation. A clear goal in aviation is safety because safe aerial
operations are useful, predictable and routine. Hence,
most pilots take personal pride in being safe. All pilots
are aware that an error can cause a serious accident. If an
accident leads -to litigation, the opportunity arises to
judge a pilot's degree of safety. If pilots perceive such
judgments as irrational, then there is no motivation to improve self-esteem; the severity of the problem is high, vulnerability is insurmountable, and the costs are infinite. If
pilot negligence law, however, is closely tuned to aviation,
then the Health Belief Model predicts that safety
problems are treatable. A realistic and understandable
safety standard is attainable because vulnerability costs
are finite. Therefore, pilots are inclined to enhance safety
if there is a rational aviation liability system with which
they can comply.
The third attributional function is that of self-presentation. Under this function, an individual attributes responsibility for results of an event in terms of social
responsibility rather than objective causation.2 0 Natu19Jennifer King, Attribution Theory and the Health Belief Model, in ATrRIBUTION
THEORY 170, 171 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
20 Hewstone, supra note 8, at 17; Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Attributions of Cause and
Responsibility as Social Phenomena, in ATrRIBUTION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEP-
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rally, social and moral attitudes, which are independent of
the physical world, influence how an individual attributes
responsibility. 2' For example, as children develop, they
gradually assimilate the rules established by the community. Those rules, like the laws of physics, become constraints on behavior.22 Thus, attributions inherently
include moral responsibility and blame.
Self-presentation is not wholly individualized and subjective, however, because with moral blame comes societal
punishment. The individual in a community with certain
social and moral standards observes that "acts are not
evaluated in accordance with motive or intention, but in
terms of their objective consequences and their conformity with established rules."2 4 Next, the individual observes that punishment follows the act and consequently
attributes the punishment to the wrong." Ultimately, an
individual objectively evaluates the magnitude of the
wrong by measuring the severity of the punishment. 6
Legal rules and punishments also influence how an individual interprets the social world.2 7 Thus, legal rules provide an objective conception of the social responsibility of
members of a community.
The self-presentation function has direct application to
pilot negligence law. For the most part, pilots are very
safety conscious, both in their approach to primary training and continuing education. Moreover, the aviation
community possesses vast practical knowledge that has
261, 268 (Jos Jaspers et al. eds.,
1983).
21 Frank D. Fincham, Developmental Dimensions of Attribution Theory, in ATrRIBU-

TUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS

TION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 117, 149 (Jos Jaspers et al. eds., 1983).
22 Id.
23 Mansur Lalijee & Robert P. Abelson, The Organizationof Explanations, in ATrTRBUTION THEORY 65, 65 (Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
24
25

Fincham, supra note 21, at 149.
Serge Moscovici & Miles Hewstone, Social Representations and Social Explana-

tions: From the 'Naive' to the 'Amateur' Scientist, in
(Miles Hewstone ed., 1983).
26
27

Fincham, supra note 21, at 149.
Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 20, at 289.

ATritBrioN THEORY

98, 123-24
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led to generally accepted rules and practices. Necessarily,
pilot negligence law is also a part of those rules. Yet if
aviation law is closely related to aviation rules gleaned
from experience, and if such tort rules are known to pilots, then pilots easily integrate them into the larger array
of rules and practices. Hence, because the pilot community encourages safety, a body of aviation negligence law
that parallels these concerns reinforces and enhances
safety.
In summary, attribution theory suggests that a system
of pilot negligence law that reflects the factors that contribute to aircraft accidents, as opposed to a system that
merely applies general negligence principles, better deters unsafe conduct and results in increased flight safety.
First, negligence law that fairly judges pilot conduct motivates pilots to take more control of the safety of their flying. Pilots have a high locus of control; improved
negligence law enhances that control by giving pilots the
assurance that they are judged from a position of aviation
knowledge. Second, improved pilot negligence law provides pilots with more accurate information, which pilots
use to act in their best interest and avoid legal liability.
Finally, improved pilot negligence law exerts more effective social pressure on pilots to act safely. "The only
practical and acceptable solution lies in enhanced education and persuasion ... to imbue pilots with mature attitudes toward flying." '28 Indeed, if negligence law is a last
resort to compensate a victim for the wrongful acts of another, certainly avoiding accidents altogether is the preferable result.
Therefore, investigation into the realities of general aviation accidents is mandatory. The investigation must focus on the roles of pilots in aircraft accidents.
Consequently, liability of the manufacturer, owner, or operator of an aircraft involved in an accident is not ger28

Melton, supra note 15, at 20.

PILOT NEGLIGENCE LA W
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mane. Although non-pilot aviation liability involves
intriguing issues, it is not appropriate to this analysis.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS TO
PILOT NEGLIGENCE LAW

A.

PILOT DISREGARD OF SAFETY PRACTICES: THE
FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS AND
NEGLIGENCE PER SE

At the outset, many safety practices already exist in the
FARs, and a pilot's violation of an FAR should be negligence per se. The doctrine of negligence per se is well established, and courts apply it in aviation cases.
Significantly, the FARs are replete with rules directly related to general aviation safety. Hence, application of
negligence per se in general aviation is appropriate. Like
all doctrines, though, particular limits should define its
boundaries in the pilot negligence context. In this way
the doctrine is consistent with the control and self-presentation functions of attribution theory.
The basic elements of negligence per se are straightforward. The doctrine applies to any statute enacted to enhance safety, that is, enacted to protect a particular group
of persons from a particular kind of harm. 29 By prescribing a special level of conduct, a safety statute defines the
duty of care in those instances in which the statute applies
and establishes a causal relationship between conduct and
harm. 30 In addition, the heightened duty under negligence per se includes a requirement to take necessary precautions to prevent injury; one in control of a situation
must protect others who are unable to protect
themselves."
29 United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 344
N.W.2d 532, 534 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
so Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 268 F. Supp. 599, 606 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
31 Florida Freight Terminals, Inc. v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978).
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FAR Safety Regulations

Safety regulations pertaining to general aviation are located in at least three parts of the FARs. The first is 14
C.F.R. Part 91, which governs the operation of aircraft operated within the United States. 2 Part 91 includes many
major flight rules such as the use of alcohol or drugs by
pilots; required preflight action; right-of-way rules; visual
flight rules; instrument flight rules; equipment, instrument, and certificate requirements; special flight operations;
maintenance;
large
and
turbine-powered
multiengine airplanes; equipment and operating requirements for large and transport category aircraft; foreign
aircraft operations and operations of U.S.-registered civil
aircraft outside of the United States; operating noise limits; and waivers.33 Most of the rules in Part 91 relate directly to proper actions and conduct while in flight,
promoting the goal of ensuring flight safety.
Safety regulations are also located in Part 61, which
prescribes the requirements for pilot certificates and ratrngs, and the privileges and limitations incident to each. 4
Each pilot certificate or rating has specific minimum requirements. For instance, Part 61 defines different types
of pilot certificates, including student pilot, recreational
pilot, private pilot, commercial pilot, airline transport pilot, pilots qualified to operate multiengine aircraft (multiengine rating), and pilots qualified to fly solely by
reference to aircraft instruments (instrument rating).3 5
Most types of pilot certificates have different ratings for
particular aircraft categories, such as fixed wing, rotary
wing, glider, and free balloon, and some of the categories
are further divided into class ratings, such as single engine and multiengine.36 For each certificate, category rating, and class rating that a pilot desires, the pilot must
14 C.F.R. § 91.1 (1992).
Id. pt. 91.
35

Id. § 61.1.
Id. pt. 61.

N Id.
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meet specific eligibility requirements and demonstrate a
minimum level of knowledge and proficiency.37 All of
these requirements are commensurate with the privileges
of the particular certificate or rating; greater authority and
responsibility come only with greater skill. Hence, every
requirement specified in Part 61 is designed to increase
the safety of flight.
Beyond initial certification requirements, Part 61 also
demands a prescribed level of recent flight experience.
First, a pilot may not act as pilot in command of an aircraft carrying passengers unless the pilot has made three
takeoffs and three landings within the past ninety days in
an aircraft of the same category, class, and, if required,
type.38 In addition, if the pilot flies at night, the takeoffs
39
and landings must have been completed at night.
Moreover, instrument flight rules cover the flight, the
pilot must have at least six hours of instrument flight time
in the preceding six months, including at least six instrument approaches to airports or an instrument competency
check. 40 Lastly, Part 61 requires a pilot to complete a

flight review within the preceding two years. 4 ' It is the
responsibility of the individual pilot to meet all of the
foregoing requirements.4 2 Clearly, each step of the recent
experience criteria is aimed at ensuring proficiency in the
operation of aircraft and the avoidance of accidents.
Finally, Part 67 contains requirements for airman medical certificates. Most pilot certificates require the holder
to possess a valid medical certificate.43 Furthermore, no
44
person with a medical deficiency may act as a pilot.

There are express requirements relating to general
37

See, e.g., id. §§ 61.123, 61.175, 61.127.

38 Id. § 61.57(c).

-9 Id. § 61.57(d).
40 Id. § 61.57(e).
41 Id. § 61.56(c).
42 See, e.g., id. § 91.103 (requiring the pilot to be familiar with all aspects of the
flight).
43 See, e.g., id. §§ 61.83(c), 61.103(c), 61.123(c), 61.151(e).
44 Id. § 61.53.
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health, vision, hearing acuity, mental and neurologic
health, cardiovascular health, and alcohol or drug dependence for each type of medial certificate. 45 Again, these
requirements attempt to maximize flight safety.
2.

FAR Negligence Per Se

Because the clear purpose of the FARs is to foster
safety, violation of most of the FARs should constitute
negligence per se. Courts hold that FARs are equivalent to
law.46 Moreover, some legal rules appropriately expand
the scope of FARs. There are, however, some prudent
limits that, if enforced by the courts, would aid the regulations' intended purpose of enhancing safety and avoid
embroiling pilot defendants in legal battles over regulatory construction.
The primary reason to apply negligence per se is that
FARs hold a high status. The FARs have the force and
effect of law. 47 FARs can be dispositive in a pilot negligence case because a violation of an FAR amounts to a
breach of a legally imposed duty. 48 Therefore, any FAR
that qualifies as a safety regulation provides a foundation
for negligence per se.
Thus, courts have found a variety of FARs to be safety
regulations and Parts 91 and 61 to be springboards for
negligence per se. For example, Part 91 regulations that
invoke the doctrine include section 91.103, which requires a pilot to be familiar with all available information
concerning the flight; 49 section 91.155, which requires a
pilot operating under visual flight rules to maintain minimum visibility and distances from clouds; 50 and section
91.113, which requires a pilot to follow air traffic right-ofway rules. 5 ' Also, others argue that failure to maintain in45
46

See e.g., id. §§ 67.13, 67.15, 67.17.
Wood v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,821, 17,823 (C.D. Cal. 1977).

47 Id.

48

Florida v. Cabanas, 354 So. 2d 1222, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).

49

Id.

- Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 268 F. Supp. 599, 606 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
5' United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. National Ins. Underwriters, 344
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strument qualifications under section 61.57(e) qualifies as
negligence per se. 52 Hence, virtually any FAR that involves
the operation of aircraft, and not merely administrative
procedure, is a safety regulation under the doctrine.
Furthermore, two ancillary legal rules support the application of negligence per se in the interest of safety. The
first is the presumption that a pilot knows, and will comply with, the FARs. For example, an air traffic controller
has a right to assume that pilots are aware of, and will
abide by, all applicable FARs.53 This implies that pilots
know their airborne duties. Such a presumption furthers
safety interests because the controller has a separate job
to perform, and policing presumably qualified pilots
should not be a part of that job. In addition, if everyone,
pilots and controllers, knows and follows the FARs, then
there is predictability in the actions of all. Therefore,
the presumption of knowledge and compliance is
appropriate.
The second rule helps to sort out the obligations of pilots and air traffic controllers. The Wood v. United States
decision may stand for the proposition that when an issue
of whether the pilot or the controller violated a regulation
exists, then the responsibility for unfortunate consequences lies with the pilot. 54 In that case, the controller
issued takeoff clearance to a pilot for a flight under visual
flight rules. Thereafter, the pilot had a duty to keep the
aircraft in visual meteorological flight conditions, i.e. out
of the clouds.5 5 In so holding, the court relied on section
91.3(a),56 which states that "[t]he pilot in command of an
aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authorN.W.2d 532, 534-35 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984). When this case was decided, 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.113 was codified at 14 C.F.R. § 91.67.
52 Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co. v. United States, 828 F.2d 1330,
1347 (8th Cir. 1987) (dissenting opinion).
" Wood v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17, 821, 17,823 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
54 Id.
55

Id.

56

Id.
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ity as to, the operation of that aircraft."' 57 This rule is appropriate because, as between pilot and controller, the
pilot is the one actually in the aircraft and consequently is
in the best position to judge the correct course of action
with respect to that aircraft. Therefore, the burden of
avoiding a regulatory violation rests with the pilot.
3.

Limits on Pilot Negligence Per Se

At the same time, pilot negligence per se should be prudently limited to avoid unfairness and unnecessary confusion. Specifically, plaintiffs in negligence per se cases must
prove all the elements of negligence; a statute defines the
duty, but the plaintiff must also show causation and damages. 58 Also, courts must strictly construe the FARs because they contain several examples of potentially
conflicting regulations.5 9
The act of a FAR violation must meet the elements of a
negligence cause of action. As with other allegedly negligent acts, the FAR violation must proximately cause injury. 60 Further, proximate causation is generally a
question for the jury. 6 ' Thus, pilot negligence per se is
part of an element of a negligence claim, not a shorter
path to liability.
Moreover, negligence per se should only apply when the
specific FAR sufficiently puts a pilot on notice of what
constitutes a violation. Because of the potential misinterpretation by the ultimate users of an FAR, courts should
not extend the FAR beyond the plain meaning of its
terms.62 Although the FARs presumably guide pilots and
14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1992).
Annau v. Schutte, 535 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Idaho 1975).
59 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(c) (flight reviews); id. § 61.51(c)(2) (logging flight
time); id. § 61.97(a) (awareness of AIM); id. § 61.105(a) (awareness of AIM)
(1992).
- Annau, 535 P.2d at 1098.
61 Id.
62 Upper Valley Aviation, Inc. v. Fryer, 392 S.W.2d 737, 741-42 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57
58
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others in aviation, confusing and conflicting regulations
exist.
There are at least three examples of such confusing regulations. The first example is the requirement for annual
flight reviews. Presently, each pilot must complete a flight
review within the preceding twenty-four calendar
months. 6
[A]fter August 31, 1993 [though], each recreational pilot
who has logged fewer than 400 hours of flight time as a
pilot and each non-instrument-rated private pilot, other
than a glider-rated private pilot, who has logged fewer
than 400 hours of flight time as a pilot must have [completed a flight review] since the beginning of the 12th calendar month before the month in which that pilot acts as
pilot-in-command of an aircraft. 64
This regulation, however, does not resolve the situation
of a pilot who holds a commercial pilot certificate for one
category of aircraft and a private pilot certificate for another category. This regulation obviously compels pilots
to obtain periodic outside reviews of their flying skills to
maintain flight safety, yet, upon reading the regulation,
one has no idea what to do in some situations.
The second example concerns the recording of flight
time as pilot in command. Conceptually, every manned
air vehicle has a pilot in command. Section 91.3 supports
this concept by placing authority and responsibility with
the pilot in command. 65 Section 61.51(c)(2), however,
states that only recreational, private, and commercial pilots may log time as pilot in command in their logbooks.6 6
The section implicitly excludes student pilots. 67 The regulations, however, permit a student pilot to fly as the sole
occupant of an aircraft. 68 Thus, if a student pilot is the
6s 14 C.F.R. § 61.56(c) (1992).

- Id. § 61.56(d).
Id. § 91.3.
Id. § 61.51(c)(2).
67 Id. § 61.51(c).
- Id. §§ 61.87, 61.89.
65

1106 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

sole occupant of an aircraft, then that flight will never be
recorded anywhere as having a pilot in command.
Required awareness of the AIM is the third example.
Applicants for recreational or private pilot certificates
must have knowledge of the use of the AIM.69 Curiously,
the FARs list no such requirement for applicants of commercial or airline transport certificates. Furthermore, the
private pilot requirement literally applies only to airplane
and rotorcraft certificates, not glider, airship, or free balloon certificates. 70 The AIM is an important document
because it describes the rules and procedures for American aviation. 7 1 Given this fact, surely the FARs do not
mean to imply that the individuals in airline cockpits need
not know anything about the airspace system in which
they fly. Hence, some FARs are ambiguous.
The foregoing examples show that a pilot who is earnestly attempting to comply with the FARs may confront
confusion. Complying with recent experience requirements, recording flight time, or even becoming a pilot can
present problems. In the context of judging a pilot's actions, it is unfair to hold a pilot liable for not understanding an incomprehensible rule. Therefore, courts should
strictly construe FARs to limit negligence per se.
In addition to strict construction, courts must alleviate
the rigidity of negligence per se in emergency situations.
In the first instance, the FARs permit violations. In an inflight emergency, the pilot may deviate from any rule of
Part 91 to the extent required to meet the emergency.72
Accordingly, in an emergency situation, a violation of a
FAR should only be evidence of negligence.73 Moreover,
the "sudden emergency" doctrine from ordinary negligence law should apply in aviation cases because the external forces in a situation may bear on the question of
- Id. §§ 61.97(a), 61.105(a).
70 Id. § 61.105.
(1992).
C.F.R. § 91.3(b) (1992); Bolick v. Sunbird Airlines, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 76, 78
(N.C. Ct. App. 1989), aft'd, 396 S.E.2d 323 (N.C. 1990).
71 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1982).
7' FAA, AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 1
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whether the pilot breached a duty of care.74 Thus, in an
emergency the pilot would only be required to exercise
due care under the circumstances. That is, when "one
who through no fault of his own, is confronted with a sudden peril and does things which afterward may seem to
have been improper or foolish is not negligent if he does
what a prudent man would or might do under the circumstances. 75 In all, the FAR violation must flow not from
the circumstances of the situation but from an unwarranted disregard of the FARs.
In summary, negligence per se should apply to pilot negligence because the FARs' primary role is safety, and negligence per se is useful in motivating pilots via the control
and self-presentation functions of attribution theory. In
its basic application, a legal rule requiring compliance
with the FARs ensures behavior that the FAA deems safe.
Of course, negligence per se must have certain limits to be
equitable, such as strict construction and the "sudden
emergency" doctrine. If designed in this way, negligence
per se will motivate pilots to control their acts, as well as
any potential liability, by merely knowing and following
the rules. If the FARs are clear and understandable, then
so are the safe practices contained therein. Also, compliance with the rules of general aviation is the societal norm
in general aviation. Pilots are indoctrinated toward safety,
and thus pilots feel a social responsibility to conform to
the aviation community, including compliance with the
FARs. Hence, the pilot negligence per se doctrine benefits
all in the form of safer aviation.
B.

PILOT DISREGARD OF THE AIRMAN'S INFORMATION
MANUAL AND OTHER FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION SAFETY LITERATURE

The FARs are not the only source of guidance in general aviation. The AIM and advisory circulars, also pub74 Bolick, 386 S.E.2d at 79.
75 Chapman v. United States,

821 (1972).

194 F.2d 974, 978 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
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lished by the FAA, provide rules for air safety, and
violation of them should be either evidence of pilot negligence or negligence per se. These documents are sources
of nonregulatory information regarding aviation in the
United States. 76 As such, they are directly relevant to the
standard of care as it relates to pilots. Indeed, the AIM
and advisory circulars provide the same motivations for
pilot control of conduct as well as pilot conformity with
the societal norms of aviation.
The AIM is the major documentary source about flying,
as it contains the fundamental information required to fly
in the United States." In addition, the AIM describes
how the FARs apply to various situations. 7 The chapters
of the AIM include detailed descriptions of, navigation
aids, airport visual aids, airspace, air traffic control, emergency procedures, safety of flight issues, aviation physiology, and aeronautical publications.79 Thus, the AIM
provides a comprehensive source of information for
pilots.
Advisory circulars supplement the material presented in
the AIM. Advisory circulars inform the aviation public of
nonregulatory materials of interest.80 The FAA issues advisory circulars with a numbering system that corresponds
to the subject areas of the FARs. 81 Examples of advisory
circulars include the Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (AC 61-23B),8 2 Aviation Weather ForPilots and Flight Operations Personnel (EA-AC 00-6A) ,83 Aviation Weather Services
(AC 00-45C), 4 and the Aviation Instructor's Handbook (AC
60-14).5 In short, the advisory circular system is the
76 FAA,
77 Id.
78

79
80

supra note 71, at 1.

In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982).
FAA, supra note 71, at 7-14.
Id. at 2.

sa Id.
82
83

FAA, PILOT'S HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE (1980).
FAA, AVIATION WEATHER FOR PILOTS AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS PERSONNEL

(1975).
FAA, AVIATION WEATHER SERVICES (1985).
s FAA, AVIATION INSTRUCTOR'S HANDBOOK (1977).
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FAA's set of pilot safety literature.
Considering the wealth and importance of the safety information contained in the AIM and advisory circulars, violation of their precepts should be at the least evidence of
negligence. The AIM and advisory circulars are evidence
of customary flying practices and are thus evidence of the
standard of care. 86 Because flying is a very specialized activity, courts must look to extra-legal references such as
the AIM and advisory circulars to ascertain whether a particular pilot acted negligently. The AIM and advisory circulars are the natural choice because, aside from the
FARs, they constitute the most authoritative source of material on aviation safety. Hence, the information contained in the AIM and advisory circulars should be a
foundation for determining pilot negligence.
Beyond just evidence, the violation of a principle in the
AIM or an advisory circular should be negligence per se.
First, if a court has no sources other than the AIM or advisory circulars to determine the appropriate standard of
care, then the court has no independent legal basis for
establishing the standard of care and will no doubt follow
the FAA's documented standards without question. Further, there is authority for the proposition that pilots are
obliged to follow the strictures of the AIM. 87 Also, in requiring that applicants for private pilot certificates be familiar with the AIM and advisory circulars, the FARs
require those pilots to know and follow them.8 8 As described above, this provision of the FARs strictly applies
only to private pilot airplane and rotorcraft certificates.
This restriction is illogical. Therefore, the AIM and advisory circulars partly define the standard of care in pilot
negligence cases, and violation of either should be negligence per se.
Logically, the limitations of the negligence per se doc8- Mallen v. United States, 506 F. Supp. 728, 735 (N.D. Ga. 1979); accord In re N500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982).
81 Barbosa v. United States, 811 F.2d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1987).
Rodriguez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1987).
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trine with respect to FAR violations should also apply to
violations of the AIM and advisory circulars. First, the
rule allegedly violated must be one intended to protect
particular persons from particular harm. Next, the violation must be the proximate cause of the injury. Also,
strict construction is required to avoid innocent misinterpretation as a basis for liability. Lastly, courts should relax negligence per se in emergency situations.
Exactly as in the FARs, pilots can internalize the practice of following the AIM and advisory circulars to enhance control and self-presentation. It is an easy task to
apply widely available documentary information into everyday flying practices. In addition, the motivation toward
greater control already exists in pilots. Therefore, pilots
can easily satisfy their desires for control by following the
published rules. Additionally, safe practices inherent in
the AIM and advisory circulars reinforce the safety-oriented norm of the aviation community. For pilots, conforming to the documents is tantamount to conforming to
the societal norm, and therefore compliance with them
permits pilots to hold themselves out as safe. Hence, pilot negligence per se should also encompass the AIM and
advisory circulars.
C.

PILOT DISREGARD OF ORDINARY CARE IN GENERAL:
WHAT SHOULD THE STANDARD OF CARE BE?

A pilot, like anyone else, is capable of acting negligently. Negligence law imposes a duty of ordinary care
upon all persons, and measures alleged negligence
against this standard. One must consider, however, the
specialized circumstances surrounding an aircraft accident
along with the general duty to use ordinary care. Accordingly, useful and rational bases for defining pilots' duty of
care are necessary. Such bases exist in the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) aircraft accident
data collected since 1969 and take the form of data on
total pilot experience, experience in the type of aircraft
involved in the accident, and pilot certification. By apply-
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ing the lessons learned from aircraft accidents to shape
measurements of pilot conduct, legal liability closely
matches pilots' operational experiences. In turn, pilots
have a clear, realistic, and attainable standard of care they
can internalize.
Unfortunately, tort law prefers a simple, global, objective standard for measuring the reasonableness of pilot
conduct, instead of a standard that is as specialized as the
activity. The duty is one of ordinary care under the circumstances.8 9 Some justification exists for this standard,
such as that suggested by Prosser and Keeton:
The whole theory of negligence presupposes some uniform standard of behavior. Yet the infinite variety of situations which may arise makes it impossible to fix definite
rules in advance for all conceivable human conduct. The
utmost that can be done is to devise something in the nature of a formula, the application of which in each particular case must be left to the jury, or to the court. The
standard of conduct which the community demands must
be an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular actor; and it
must be, so far as possible, the same for all persons, since
the law can have no favorites. At the same time, it must
make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the actor,
for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances under
which he must act. 90
In addition, there seems to be a major fear that any elaboration on the basic negligence standard somehow invalidates the ordinary rules of negligence. 91
Jury instructions, however, never seem to be as simple
as "ordinary care under the circumstances." Consider,
for example:
Negligence is the doing of some act which a reasonably
prudent person would not do, or the failure to do some89 Galindo v. TMT Transport, Inc., 733 P.2d 631, 632 (Ariz. 1986); DiCenzo v.
Izawa, 723 P.2d 171, 179 (Haw. 1986).
- Galindo, 733 P.2d at 632-33 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 32, at 173 (5th ed. 1984)).

91 DiCenzo, 723 P.2d at 180.
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thing which a reasonably prudent person would do, under
the circumstances shown by the evidence. It is the failure
to use ordinary care.
Ordinary care is that care which persons of ordinary
prudence would, under the circumstances shown by the
evidence, exercise in the management of their own affairs
in order to avoid injury or damage to themselves or their
property, or to the persons or property of others.
Ordinary care is not an absolute term, but a relative
one. That is to say, in deciding whether ordinary care was
exercised in a given case, the conduct in question must be
considered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, as shown by the evidence. 2
The simple, objective standard seems to be cast off. Prosser and Keeton make allowances for apparent risk, capacity of the actor, and circumstances. Likewise, the jury
instruction above mentions the "surrounding circumstances" three times. Consequently, although courts and
commentators profess an all-encompassing negligence
standard, the standard tends to be situation-specific.
The current standard of care in pilot negligence cases is
the same regarding care and circumstances. Pilots have a
duty to exercise ordinary care, based on common law
principles of negligence.9" Still, ordinary care in pilot
negligence cases depends on the surrounding circumstances. Again, circumstances creep into the analysis and
make each case unique.
By acknowledging the existence of circumstances,
courts must ultimately address the circumstance of pilot
experience. A court may refuse to inject pilot experience
into the standard of care, but still must regard it as a circumstance. T-Craft Aero Club, Inc. v. Blough 94 provides an
example:
Id. at 178 (quoting RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965)).
Hayes v. United States, 899 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1990); Mackey v. Miller,
273 S.E.2d 550, 552 (Va. 1981); Todd v. Weikle, 376 A.2d 104, 109 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1977); Rennekamp v. Blair, 101 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa. 1954) (applying
West Virginia law).
9
642 P.2d 70 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982).
92

93
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Blough next challenges the standard of care applied by the
trial court. She contends that the court used the standard
of an experienced pilot exercising ordinary care, rather
than the standard of a student pilot exercising ordinary
care. The argument suggests that there are separate standards for experienced pilots and student pilots. This
premise is incorrect. There is only one standard-ordinary care. The degree of experience is a factor to be considered, along with other circumstances, in applying the
standard. 9 5
Thus, the Blough court rejected a different standard of
care, but nonetheless considered pilot experience to be a
factor.
Conversely, the court in Surface v. Johnson9 6 implicitly
adopted a variable standard of care in a pilot negligence
case. Fred Johnson, defendant's decedent, was a student
pilot who died in the crash of his airplane. The court said
that:
it is clear that Johnson was negligent in even undertaking
the flight in question. In so doing, Johnson was not only
guilty of simple negligence, but ... of culpable and wanton negligence in undertaking a night flight far beyond the
level of his experience and training over mountainous terrain in extremely bad weather. He knowingly undertook
the same flight that Perdue [Johnson's flight instructor], a
far more qualified and experienced pilot, had declined to
take in Johnson's plane because of existing conditions.9 7
Here, the court assigned a higher degree of negligence to
Johnson only by virtue of his lack of experience. Yet, the
question remains whether Perdue, an experienced pilot,
would have been negligent or wantonly negligent in attempting the same flight. Because the court did not say
that anyone who attempted this flight would have been
wantonly negligent, the answer apparently is that a pilot
like Perdue would have been simply negligent. There72.
214 S.E.2d 152 (Va. 1975).
Id. at 154-55.

95 Id. at
9

97
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fore, the Surface court implied that it would recognize a
variable standard of care in pilot negligence cases.
The court in Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc.98 seemed to combine the two foregoing formulae. First, the court held
that "[t]he trial court improperly introduced a subjective
standard of care into the definition of negligence by referring to the 'ordinary care, and caution, which an ordinary
prudent pilot having the same training and experience as Fred
Heath, would have used in the same or similar circumstances.'-99 Then, the court acknowledged
that one who engages in a business, occupation, or profession must exercise the requisite degree of learning, skill,
and ability of that calling with reasonable and ordinary
care, [and, f]urthermore, the specialist within a profession
may be held to a standard of care greater than that required of the general practitioner. 00
This rule presents three different reasonably prudent persons: the ordinary person, the professional, and the professional specialist. While the Heath court settled for the
ordinary person, the ordinary person standard does not
address reality because the ordinary person knows little
about flying, just as the ordinary person knows little about
law or medicine. The best pigeonhole for pilots might be
the second tier, that of one in a skilled calling, although
many pilots do not receive compensation for flying. A
pilot, such as a flight instructor, may even fit into the specialist class. However, to not address the pilot experience
issue at all is to ignore the phrase "under the
circumstances."
Ultimately, the Heath court leaves us in suspense. "The
plaintiff is entitled to an instruction holding Fred Heath to
the objective minimum standard of care applicable to all
pilots." ° 1 The contours of the objective minimum standard are left to the imagination of the reader. Accepting
252 S.E.2d 526 (N.C. App. Ct. 1979).
- Id. at 529 (quoting plaintiff assignment of error No. 4).

98

.00Id.
IOIId.
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the challenge, the following is an imaginative attempt to
define those minima.
An appropriate minimum standard for judging pilots as
trained specialists must flow from a rational examination
of the widely diverse population of those pilots. Certainly
pilots must conform to a higher standard of care commensurate with their expertise in aviation. After all, negligence law dictates that lawyers, as legal specialists, must
exercise the same skill, prudence, and diligence as ordinary lawyers, not ordinary persons.10 2 Although this standard of care for pilots must be higher than simple
ordinary care, it must be practical when applied to pilots
with a few hours' experience as well as to pilots with
thousands of hours logged. With this in mind, objectivity
compels a study of pilots' propensity for aircraft accidents
with respect to total flying experience, total experience in
the particular type of aircraft involved in the accident, and
level of pilot certification. The result will be an "objective
minimum standard of care applicable to all pilots."'0 3
The first study compares accidents with total flight time
of the pilots in command of the accident aircraft. The following tables summarize the total number of accidents in
each range of total flight time, corrected to reflect the var10 4
ious sizes of the experience intervals.
Pilot Experience,
Hours

Corrected Total,
All Accidents 0 5

0-50
5492.0
50-100
5202.0
100-500
2421.5
500-1000
899.0
1000-5000
256.4
5000-10,000
57.4
Pilot experience unknown in 3.1% of accidents.
102 Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421, 422-23
(Cal. 1971) (en banc).

10- Heath, 252 S.E.2d at 529.

104See infra Appendix A for an explanation of data analysis.
105 ANNUAL REVIEW OF AIRCRAFr ACCIDENT DATA,
U.S. GENERAL AVIATION,
CALENDAR YEAR 1988 30 (1991) [hereinafter ARAAD, followed by the year];
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Corrected Total,
Fatal Accidents 10 6

0-50
351.0
50-100
448.0
100-500
251.6
500-1000
93.2
1000-5000
24.7
5000-10,000
6.0
Pilot experience unknown in 6.6% of accidents.
The data show two significant trends. First, accidents
drop sharply after 100 hours of total experience. Second,
at each succeeding interval after 100 hours, decreases in
corrected accidents are successively greater. The 100-500
hour accident figures decline from the 50-100 hour
figures by 53.5% and 44.0% for total and fatal accidents,
respectively. Likewise, the percent changes from 100-500
hours to 500-1000 hours are 62.9% for total accidents
and 63.0% for fatal accidents. The percent reductions
progressively increase with higher levels of pilot
experience.
Although all of the decreases in accidents are large, the
objective minimum standard should be set at 500 hours.
The progressively larger accident decreases would justify
placing the standard at any point over 100 hours, even
10,000 hours. Standards higher than 500 hours, however,
would be unrealistic because few pilots possess that much
experience. 0 7 In practice, therefore, a very high standard
ARAAD 1987 29 (1989); ARAAD 1986 29 (1988); ARAAD 1985 29 (1987);
ARAAD 1984 29 (1987); ARAAD 1983 28 (1987); ARAAD 1982 28 (1986);
ARAAD 1981 27 (1984); ARAAD 1980 25 (1984); ARAAD 1979 99 (1981);
ARAAD 1978 97 (1980); ARAAD 1977 100 (1978); ARAAD 1976 89 (1978);
ARAAD 1975 86 (1977); ARAAD 1974 87 (1976); ARAAD 1973 91 (1975);
ARAAD 1972 91 (1974); ARAAD 1970 15 (1974); ARAAD 1969 14 (1971).
I06 ARAAD 1979 99 (1981); ARAAD 1978 97 (1980); ARAAD 1977 100 (1978);
ARAAD 1976 87 (1978); ARAAD 1975 86 (1977); ARAAD 1974 87 (1976);
ARAAD 1973 91 (1975); ARAAD 1972 91 (1974); ARAAD 1970 15 (1974);
ARAAD 1969 14 (1971).
107

See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
1992 629 (112th ed. 1991) (stating that almost half of the pilot certifi-

STATES:

cates held in the United States are student or private certificates).
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would require the training of student pilots to the level of
airline captain before permitting them to fly solo. On the
other hand, setting the standard very low, such as at 100
hours, is similarly unpalatable. A pilot with 100 hours experience is barely qualified to carry passengers. The
FARs require forty hours just to apply for an airplane private pilot certificate. 0 8 Also, 100 hours may be only a few
months' flying experience.10 9 Lastly, setting a low standard would be admitting that flying is dangerous, and
consequently, high accident rates are inevitable. This
logic contravenes the hypothesis that all accidents are preventable, and that pilots can control how many accidents
they prevent. It also contradicts the FAA's opinion that
private pilots with less than 400 hours need annual, rather
than biennial, flight reviews to maintain proficiency."
Hence, according to statistics of total accidents versus pilot experience, the minimum standard should be the ordinarily prudent pilot with 500 hours of flight time.
The next study compares the numbers of total and fatal
accidents to pilot experience in aircraft type, to see
whether more specialized experience reduces accidents.
The following tables summarize the NTSB data.
Pilot Time in Type,
Hours

Corrected Total,
All Accidents,
1969-19791'1

0-50
16000.0
50-100
5984.0
100-500
1495.0
500-1000
338.9
1000-3000
72.2
Pilot experience unknown in 5.2% of accidents.
loS 14 C.F.R. § 61.109 (1992).
109 See, e.g., the 30-day guaranteed instrument rating course offered by American Flyers, Addison, Texas. An instrument rating requires 40 hours of instrument
time. 14 C.F.R. § 61.65(e)(2) (1992).
1lo See 14 C.F.R. § 61.56 (1992).
'11 ARAAD 1979 99 (1981); ARAAD 1978 97 (1980); ARAAD 1977 100 (1978);
ARAAD 1976 89 (1978); ARAAD 1975 86 (1977); ARAAD 1974 91 (1976);
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Hours

0-50
50-100
100-500
500-1000
1000-5000
5000-10,000
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Corrected Total,
All Accidents,
19821988'

12

5559.0
2434.0
659.9
160.8
23.8
2.0

Pilot experience unknown in 13.4% of accidents.

Pilot Time in Type,
Hours

Corrected Total,
Fatal Accidents,
1969-1979113

1949.0
0-50
829.0
50-100
195.8
100-500
44.0
500-1000
9.3
1000-3000
Pilot experience unknown in 26.3% of accidents.
The trends in the data are similar to those relating accidents to total experience. At each interval of greater experience in aircraft type, the number of accidents
significantly declines, and the reductions grow toward the
bottom of each table. Percent reductions in accidents
from 0-50 hours to 50-100 hours vary between 56% and
62%, and subsequent reductions range from 73% to 92%
between each interval.
ARAAD 1973 87 (1975); ARAAD 1972 91 (1974); ARAAD 1970 15
ARAAD 1969 14 (1971); see infra Appendix A for data analysis.
112 ARAAD 1988 30 (1991); ARAAD 1987 29 (1989); ARAAD 1986 29
ARAAD 1985 29 (1987); ARAAD 1984 29 (1987); ARAAD 1983 28
ARAAD 1982 28 (1986); see infra Appendix A for data analysis.
I's ARAAD 1979 99 (1981); ARAAD 1978 97 (1980); ARAAD 1977 100
ARAAD 1976 87 (1978); ARAAD 1975 86 (1977); ARAAD 1974 87
ARAAD 1973 91 (1975); ARAAD 1972 91 (1974); ARAAD 1970 15
ARAAD 1969 14 (1971); see infra Appendix A for data analysis.

(1974);
(1988);
(1987);
(1980);
(1976);
(1974);
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The data indicate that the minimum standard of care
should be set at 100 hours of time in type. Pilots at the
high end of the 50-100 hour group are involved in far
fewer than half the number of accidents as pilots with less
than fifty hours in type. Next, pilots with 100 hours in
type are also at the lower end of the 100-500 hour group,
which has more than three-quarters less propensity toward accidents than the 50-100 hour group. Also, the assignment of 100 hours is probably realistic in terms of the
flight experience of any particular pilot. Hypothetically,
for instance, the ordinary 500 hour pilot would have experience spread over five types of aircraft. Hence, the objective minimum standard should be the ordinarily prudent
pilot with 100 hours of experience in the type of aircraft
involved in the accident.
The final study relates accidents to the pilot certificate
held by the pilot in command of the accident aircraft.
Holding a pilot certificate signifies two things. First, it
shows that the pilot has at least a certain amount of total
experience. In powered airplanes, for instance, a private
pilot has at least forty hours," 4 a commercial pilot has at
least 250 hours," 5 and an airline transport pilot has at
least 1500 hours." 6 A certificate also denotes that the
holder demonstrated the requisite levels of knowledge
and proficiency during the pilot's FAA flight test.'" The
table below shows how this circumstance compares with
aircraft accidents.
14 C.F.R. § 61.113(a) (1992).
115Id. § 61.129(b).
114

116 Id. § 61.155(b)(2).

"7 See, e.g., id. §§ 61.013(e), 61.123(3), 61.167(a).
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Pilot Certificate
Student
Private
Commercial
Airline Transport
Private with Instructor Rating
Commercial with Instructor
Rating
Airline Transport/Instructor
None
Unknown
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Percent of Fatal or
Serious Accidents' 18
7.7
44.6
27.0
3.7
0.1
11.9
3.1
1.4
0.5
100.0

The data show that the minimum standard should be
the ordinary private pilot. Most of the accidents in the
period involved either a private or a commercial pilot.
The distribution between the two is roughly equal; the
Commercial and Commercial with Instructor Rating categories total 38.9%, which is comparable to 44.6% for the
Private category. Hence, there is no need to consider using commercial pilot skills in the minimum pilot standard
because there are nearly as many accidents with commercial pilots as with private pilots. Moreover, although airline transport pilots have far fewer accidents, they
probably comprise a very small fraction of the pilot population. Likewise, a student pilot standard is not proper
because student pilots are not even qualified to carry passengers. 119 Thus, the objective minimum standard should
be the ordinarily prudent private pilot.
In conclusion, analysis of NTSB general aviation accident data indicates that the objective minimum standard
to apply in pilot negligence cases should be the degree of
118 ARAAD 1979 102 (1981); ARAAD 1978 100 (1980); ARAAD 1977 103
(1978); ARAAD 1976 92 (1978); ARAAD 1975 89 (1977); ARAAD 1974 90
(1976); ARAAD 1973 94 (1975); ARAAD 1974 94 (1976); see infra Appendix A for
data analysis.
11914 C.F.R. § 61.89(a)(1) (1992).
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care exercised by an ordinarily prudent private pilot with
500 hours of total flight experience and 100 hours experience in the accident aircraft type. Pilots with 500 hours
total and 100 in type are substantially less likely to be involved in aviation accidents than less experienced pilots.
Also, while actual experience bears directly upon accident
propensity, the additional flying skill of commercial pilots
over private pilots does not. Further, this standard supports the control function of attribution theory. The standard is within the comprehension, and likely within the
grasp, of most pilots.
Thus, if a particular pilot possesses less experience,
then that pilot will be on notice that he or she must
sharpen his or her airmanship skills to the legally acceptable level. Likewise, a pilot with superior experience will
know that the skills to be especially safe in the air are present, and the capacity to exceed the threshold of legal negligence exists. Of course, expert testimony would educate
jurors on the skills and knowledge of the standard pilot.
Therefore, the law should base general aviation pilot negligence determinations on this standard.
D.

LIABILITY FOR PILOT MISTAKES AND POOR JUDGMENT

Pilot negligence law must also account for the remaining accidents that result from pilot error in the form of
mistakes and poor judgment. Imposing liability for mistakes and poor judgment does not fit within the tort law
policy of deterring culpable conduct. Mistakes infer actions that result in unintended, unforeseeable results,
rather than actions without regard for others' safety. Despite that, to forego consideration of accidents caused by
mistakes and poor judgment is to ignore the hypothesis
that human fault is always present in aircraft accidents.
The question, then, is what are the other human agencies
that contribute to pilot error. There are three pilot-candidates. The first is the flight instructor who provided the
initial flight training to the pilot of the accident aircraft.
The second is the check airman who issued the accident
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pilot's certificate. The third is the flight instructor who
conducted the accident pilot's most recent recurrent
training.
The pilot's primary flight instructor may have potential
liability because the skills that the pilot learned initially
are vital to the pilot's exercise of safe practices. Many aspects of flying have no counterparts in everyday activities,
so the beginning student's knowledge base is small. To
become an airplane private pilot, for example, a person
must complete a course of instruction on such topics as
navigation, weather, aeronautical weather reports and
forecasts, high-density airport operations, collision avoidance procedures, radio communications, and aerodynamics. ' 2 Above all, though, a student pilot learns the
fundamental skill of proper judgment.
In aviation, judgment is the ability to make sound decisions both on the ground and in the air. It is the most
important single attribute of a safe pilot .... A responsible attitude, adequate knowledge, and the skills developed
through experience
are the ingredients required for good
2
decision making.' 1
Accordingly, most of aviation is unfamiliar to the new student. Thus, proper initial training is necessary to flight
safety.
However, holding a pilot's primary flight instructor liable for the pilot's mistakes or poor judgment is not a suitable rule. The pilot's initial instruction may be years or
decades distant, requiring a stretch of the causation chain.
Next, the pilot in command rule of section 91.3 clearly
dictates that any pilot not aboard the aircraft does not
have ultimate responsibility for that aircraft. 2 2 Lastly, a
rule imposing liability on a flight instructor for another's
lapse of judgment does not reconcile with the control
function of attribution theory because the flight instructor
is not present to exert any control over the accident air120

12
122

14 C.F.R. § 61.105(a) (1992).
FAA, MANUAL OF FLIGHT 11-15 (1985).
14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1992).
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craft or pilot. Hence, pilot negligence law should not assess liability against a primary flight instructor for the
mistakes or poor judgment of the instructor's former
student.
The second candidate is the pilot's check airman. A
prerequisite of any pilot certificate or rating, except student pilot, is the successful completion of an oral and
flight test. 23 The test, given by an FAA inspector or examiner, focuses on procedures and maneuvers required
by the flight proficiency provisions pertaining to that certificate. 24 As the FARs specify, either FAA inspectors,
who are FAA employees, or designated examiners, who
are qualified members of the pilot community, may conduct flight tests. 2 5 These individuals are known collectively as check airmen. Thus, when a check airman
evaluates a pilot applicant, the check airman essentially
certifies that, at the moment in time of the test, the applicant possesses skills at the levels required for the certificate or rating sought.
Clearly, check airmen are analogous to primary flight
instructors with respect to liability if the pilot applicant is
later involved in an aircraft accident. Like flight instructors, check airmen could be temporally distant. Also, the
pilot in command rule does not change with the addition
26
of greater privileges to the accident pilot's certificate.
Finally, check airmen have no means of control over potential accidents, and are at the mercy of the future competency of pilot applicants. Therefore, pilot negligence
law should not impose liability on a check airman for the
mistakes or poor judgment of a past flight test applicant.
Chronologically, the third candidate in the sequence of
evaluators of the pilot of the accident aircraft is the flight
instructor who conducted the pilot's most recent recurrent training. Each pilot must successfully complete a bi,23 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.

§ 61.103(e); see also id. §§ 61.96(e), 61.167(a).
§ 61.103(e); see also id. §§ 61.96(e), 61.123(e), 61.167(a).
§ 61.103(e); see also id. §§ 61.96(e), 61.123(e), 61.167(a).
§ 91.3.

1124 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[58

ennial flight review to act as a pilot in command. 2 7 The
flight review consists of a review of the flight rules of Part
91 and a review of the flight maneuvers and procedures
that the administrator of the review feels are necessary to
ascertain the pilot's competency. 128 Although any person
designated by the FAA may conduct flight reviews, flight
instructors usually administer them. 12 9
A flight instructor could rightfully be liable for negligently conducting a flight review. A biennial flight review
is a very minimal continuing training requirement. The
competency standard, that the pilot "demonstrate the safe
exercise of the privileges of the pilot certificate,"' 30 is
vague. Moreover, nowhere does the regulation state that
the pilot and flight instructor must actually fly together.
Without any specific requirements for flight reviews, a
flight instructor could possibly conduct a cursory review
and send off an obviously deficient pilot. In such a case, it
would be reasonable to hold the flight instructor liable for
contributing to an accident.
Despite the case of patent instructor neglect, though,
assessing liability for mistakes and poor judgment in inadequate recurrent training is unsuitable because evidence
has shown that mistakes are directly proportional to
expertise.
[T]he mental errors that lead to horrendous accidents are
indistinguishable in nature from the trivial, absentminded
slips and lapses of everyday life.
These findings underscore a crucial point about absentminded errors: they are characteristic of highly skilled activities-a problem of the expert, not the beginner. That
seems to run contrary to common sense, since people expend a great deal of effort to acquire skills so that they will
not make mistakes. Yet, paradoxically, the probability of
making an absentminded error increases with proficiency
at a particular task. The more skilled we become at an acId. § 61.56(c).
Id. § 61.56(a).
129 Id. § 61.56(b)(1).
1soId. § 61.56(a)(2).
127
128
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tivity, the fewer demands it makes upon consciousness.''
In fact, the author of the above quotation began by
describing the 747 collision at Tenerife as an example of a
terrible blunder by a skilled person. 3 2 As the example
shows, flying is a very specialized activity, and pilots are
susceptible to the same lapses as other specialists.
Therefore, mandating higher levels of recurrent training does not increase flight instructor control over future
nonnegligent mistakes of other pilots. The evidence suggests that, for a flight instructor to reduce mistakes and
poor judgment, the instructor would have to decrease the
proficiency of the pilot. This remedy is illogical because it
contradicts the NTSB data showing that safety increases
with experience. Hence, holding a flight instructor, as an
administrator of recurrent training, liable for the mistakes
and poor judgment of the accident pilot is inappropriate.
On the whole, attribution theory cannot apply to pilot
negligence law to avert aircraft accidents caused by mistakes and poor judgment because no individuals are properly liable for the pilot mistakes or poor judgment that
cause aircraft accidents. The accident aircraft's pilot is
not liable because such conduct is not a negligent breach
of his or her duty of care. The only foundation of liability
in this case would be strict liability. Strict liability, however, contravenes the hypothesis because attribution theory focuses on how a person consciously influences the
physical world, not on a person's unintended actions. Beyond that, the pilot's primary flight instructor or check
airman should not be liable due to temporal distance and
inability to control the circumstances of the unfortunate
flight. Finally, imposing liability on a flight instructor who
conducts recurrent training is unfair and unworkable because of the direct relation between pilot proficiency and
propensity for mistakes. Accordingly, the only airman
131Reason,
132

supra note 1, at 48.

Id. at 45.
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who should be answerable for an aircraft accident is the
accident pilot alone.
E.

RES IpsA LOQUITUR IN PILOT NEGLIGENCE CASES

The NTSB accident data suggests that res ipsa loquitur is
not an appropriate theory to apply in general aviation pilot negligence cases. First, the data shows that aircraft accidents normally occur without negligence on the part of
the pilot. Placing responsibility where it does not belong
discourages the control function of attribution theory.
Also, the issue of the defendant pilot's control of the instrumentality is more amorphous in aviation cases, either
because the conduct of several individuals bears on the
question of negligence or because others' conduct is completely irrelevant. Further, an improper use of the instrumental control requirement is inconsistent with the selfesteem function. Hence, the nature of aviation compels
disposal of res ipsa loquitur in pilot negligence cases.
The elements of common law res ipsa loquitur are well
established.
[T]here are three conditions for the application of the
doctrine: "(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; [and] (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff."' 3 3
Moreover, res ipsa loquitur has permeated pilot negli34
gence law. For instance, the court in Todd v. Weikle'
opined that "[iln the absence of statutory authority, the
rules of law governing aviation cases are the same as those
governing ordinary negligence actions,"' 135 making res ipsa
loquitur applicable to aviation accidents. In contrast, the
,38 Newing v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d 33, 39 (Cal. 1975) (quoting Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (Cal. 1944)).
376 A.2d 104 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
135

Id. at 109.
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court in Surface v. Johnson 13 6 took the opposite view. "We
decline to draw such inferences [of negligence] from the
mere happening of the crash, for it is a matter of common
knowledge that an aircraft may fall or crash in the absence
3 7
of negligence or fault on the part of its pilot.'
Although the Virginia Supreme Court made this statement in dicta, later decisions interpret it to mean not that
aircraft may crash without negligence, but rather that res
ipsa loquitur does not apply to aircraft accidents. 3 8 As
these cases show, different courts reach opposite conclusions on the same question. Apparently, courts make
both decisions with a lack of evidence of which is the rational choice. The NTSB accident data and the FARs provide helpful information in this regard.
Accident data serves to explain the proper disposition
of the first element of res ipsa loquitur. The issue is whether
pilot negligence normally causes injuries in aircraft accidents. The NTSB accident data illuminate this issue. Between 1982 and 1986, there were 8721 fatal aircraft
accidents involving U.S. registered aircraft.' 3 9 The NTSB
determined that 89.4 percent of these accidents were
broadly due, at least partially, to pilot error. 4 0 However,
only 26.3 percent of accidents attributed to pilot error resulted from negligent or culpable conduct on the part of
the pilot.' 4 ' Accordingly, only 23.4 percent of all the fatal
accidents occurring during the period occurred because
of pilot negligence.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is not appropriate to pilot negligence cases because most aircraft accidents occur without
pilot negligence. The accident data show that, when a fatal aircraft accident was partially due to pilot error, there
214 S.E.2d 152 (Va. 1975).
Id. at 154.
138 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 671 F.2d 810, 815 (4th Cir. 1982).
139ARAAD 1986 31 (1988); ARAAD 1985 34 (1987); ARAAD 1984 34 (1987);
ARAAD 1983 37 (1987); ARAAD 1982 37 (1986).
140 Id.
141 ARAAD 1986 86-150 (1988); ARAAD 1985 177-233 (1987); ARAAD 1984
179-231 (1987); ARAAD 1983 202-247 (1987); ARAAD 1982 205-245 (1986).
136
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is less than one chance in three that pilot negligence
caused the accident. Furthermore, in any fatal accident,
chances are less than one in four that pilot negligence
caused the injuries. There is no place for inferences of
pilot negligence in a tort system wherein proof is based
on a preponderance of the evidence. Even considering
potential analytical error, the data analysis would need an
error margin of over 100 percent for pilot negligence to
be more probable than not. Putting responsibility where
it does not probably belong discourages the principle that
pilots may control the consequences of accidents and litigation. Thus, aircraft accidents do normally happen in the
absence of pilot negligence, and the first element of res
ipsa loquitur does not apply.
The second element of res ipsa loquitur, that of exclusive
control of the agency or instrumentality by the defendant,
also raises issues particular to pilot negligence. Plainly,
this element addresses whether it was indeed the defendant who breached a duty of care, and not some other, possibly unknown, individual. In general aviation, this issue
particularly arises in two situations: when it is not certain
that the defendant pilot was actually flying the aircraft,
and when the defendant was not aboard the aircraft.
The first scenario appears when the accident aircraft
has two sets of flight controls. In many general aviation
aircraft, two occupants have before them, within convenient reach, the mechanical controls necessary to operate
the aircraft. Consequently, when such an aircraft crashes
and all aboard perish, a question emerges as to who flew
the aircraft. Although the pilot in command customarily
occupies a particular seat, the conclusion that the pilot in
command was flying at the time of impact does not automatically follow.
Nonetheless, courts have fashioned rules to apply to
this situation. If the front seat occupants were both pilots,
then the issue of control is not ascertainable.
Regardless of which one of the decedents may have been
operating the plane the other could have taken some ac-
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tion which precipitated the difficulty. Any conclusion we
draw must be based upon surmise and conjecture ...
The finding of negligence is immaterial until we can determine the identity of the person
to be charged with respon142
sibility for the negligence.
However, when only one pilot is within reach of the controls, then there may be a presumption that the pilot was
actually in control of the aircraft. The fact that a passenger occupies a seat provided with controls does not, by
itself, mean that the aircraft was not under the exclusive
control of the pilot.'4 3 Hence, legal rules exist to address
the issue of dual aircraft controls.
A more obvious issue regarding the second element
arises when the pilot defendant was not aboard the air44
craft when it crashed. The court in Lejeune v. Collard1
addressed this issue. Lejeune was a student pilot who
crashed while flying solo. Collard, Lejeune's flight instructor, was on the ground at the time of the accident.
The court held that
[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application in this
case because of the fact that the accident might have occurred through the negligence of the pilot, Lejeune....
The air plane and the resultant unfortunate accident was
[sic] under the control
and knowledge of the plaintiff and
45
not the defendant.'

Thus, the significant question in this type of case is
whether the defendant could possibly have exercised control over the instrumentality. If not, res ipsa loquitur cannot
apply.
While the foregoing rules regarding the second element of res ipsa loquitur are reasonable and equitable, they
are superseded by the FARs. "The pilot in command of
an aircraft is directly responsible for ...

the operation of

Mitchell v. Eyre, 12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,880, 17,883-84 (Neb. 1973).
113Ayer v. Boyle, 37 Cal. App. 3d 882, 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); accord Newing
v. Cheatham, 540 P.2d at 33, 41 (Cal. 1975).
144 44 So. 2d 504 (La. Ct. App. 1950).
145Id. at 508-09.
142
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that aircraft."'146 Again, the FARs have the force and effect of law.' 47 The Supreme Court of Minnesota eloquently explained this provision:
The civil air regulations do not, and cannot, establish rules
for the imposition of liability. However, they do impose
duties and responsibilities which, in effect, specify the
standard of care that is imposed upon the pilot in command, which, in turn, is employed by common-law negligence principles in defining negligence. Thus, the rule
applicable to aircraft is that if the aircraft is operated in a
negligent manner the pilot in command is negligent regardless of whether or not he is at the controls at the
time-at least in the absence of extenuating circumstances
such as sudden illness. This surely imposes a high duty
and heavy burden upon the pilot in command of aircraft.
However, the duty is commensurate with the skills required and the perils incurred. We take judicial notice of
the difference between air traffic and travel by rail, highway, and canal. The speed, the variable three-dimensional
movement of aircraft in flight, the complexity of instrumentation and controls, the necessity for constant vigilance, and the ever-present threat of disaster in case of
accident all require higher skills, greater precautions, and
heavier responsibilities to constitute due care in the operation of aircraft than in the operation of land or water vehicles. These considerations make it appropriate that the
pilot in command have complete authority to control the
operation of the aircraft in flight and that he have corresponding responsibility. 48
Accordingly, the one and only pilot in command of an aircraft is responsible regardless of whether the pilot in command was manipulating the controls at the time of the
accident. Further, the pilot-in-command rule logically excludes any pilots not present in the accident aircraft.
Hence, judicial massaging of the second element of res ipsa
loquitur is both unnecessary and improper.
14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1992).
,41 Wood v. United States, 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,821, 17,823 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
148 Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc., 108 N.W.2d 428, 432-33 (Minn.
1961).
146
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Also, the pilot-in-command rule is consistent with the
attribution hypothesis. An obvious consequence of a pilot
taking to the air is control of an aircraft. The pilot-incommand rule puts responsibility and authority in the
same place as control, with the pilot. The rule additionally supports the self-esteem function. Under the Health
Belief Model, pilots tend to act in their own best interest.
The pilot-in-command rule tells pilots that their best interest is to act to the benefit of flight safety. Therefore,
the pilot-in-command rule should dominate over the second element of res ipsa loquitur.
In summary, res ipsa loquitur is not an appropriate doctrine for pilot negligence actions. Actual accident data
supports the conclusion that aircraft accidents normally
occur in the absence of pilot negligence. Besides, the second element of the doctrine is effectively bypassed in the
face of the pilot-in-command rule. Hence, the only sensible solution is to remove res ipsa loquitur from the field of
pilot negligence law.
F.

STRICT LIABILITY IN GENERAL AVIATION

The final principle bearing on pilot negligence law is
aviation strict liability. This concept emerged during the
infancy of aviation, when flying was more thrilling than
practical. Yet, strict liability lives on today. Nevertheless,
strict liability should be stricken for three reasons. First,
the original justification for strict liability departed long
ago. Second, strict liability works to make state law internally inconsistent. Third, strict liability contravenes attribution theory, and thus reduces safety.
Unlike the deep traditions of American law, aviating began in this century mostly as a diversionary sport.
In the early days of aviation, the cases and treatises were
replete with references to the hazards of "aeroplanes."
The following assessment is typical: "[E]ven the best constructed and maintained aeroplane is so incapable of complete control that flying creates a risk that the plane even
though carefully constructed, maintained and operated,
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may crash to the injury of persons, structures and chattels
on the land over which the flight is made." RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS, § 520, comment b (1938). As colorfully
stated in Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 78, at 556 (5th
ed. 1984): "Flying was of course regarded at first as a
questionable and highly dangerous enterprise,
the prov49
ince exclusively of venturesome fools."'
In 1922 the Commission on Uniform Laws proposed
the Uniform Aeronautics Act, which made aircraft owners
strictly liable for all ground damage caused by aircraft. 5 °
Additionally, the First Restatement of Torts regarded aviation as an ultrahazardous activity.
An activity is ultrahazardous if it necessarily involves a risk
of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others
which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of
the utmost
15
care, and is not a matter of common usage.
Thus, based on the points quoted above, the Restatement
commented that "aviation in its present stage of development is ultrahazardous.'1

52

Through 1938, then, the law

regarded aviation as an uncommon activity, full of unmitigable risk.
This attitude persisted notwithstanding the advance of
technology. Ultimately, twenty-three states adopted the
Uniform Aeronautics Act. 15 Moreover, the Second Restatement of Torts allotted a section to aviation strict
liability:
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the
ground is caused by the ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the dropping or falling of an object from the
aircraft, the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability
for the harm, even though he has exercised the utmost
care to prevent it, and the owner of the aircraft is subject
to similar liability if he has authorized or permitted the
149Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co., 746 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Wash. 1987) (citations

omitted).
150Il
151 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
15 Id. cmt. b.

15 Crosby, 746 P.2d at 1200.
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54

Thus, even in the years following moon landings and supersonic transports, some did not consider'aviation as an
everyday activity.
This view has been largely rejected though. By 1943,
the Commission on Uniform Laws regarded the Uniform
Aeronautics Act as obsolete. 55 Today, there are apparently only five states with aviation strict liability statutes in
force:
Delaware, 156 Hawaii, 157 Minnesota, 5 8 New
59
Jersey,
and South Carolina. 16 Also, these statutes apply only to aircraft owners; pilots are liable only for damages caused by their own negligence.' 6' Strict liability,
however, is still relevant to pilot negligence because many
pilots own their aircraft, and the second Restatement still
professes the doctrine against operators. Thus, strict liability provides another theory in litigation against pilots.
Nevertheless, the justification for strict liability is defunct. The NTSB accident records clearly show that general aviation is not ultrahazardous. While accumulating
628,396,321 flight hours over twenty years, there have
been only 12,411 fatal general aviation aircraft accidents. 62 These figures reduce to a rate of 1.98 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours. Statistically, an individual
would have to be airborne for 5.76 years before dying in a
general aviation aircraft accident. Moreover, the fatal ac63
cident rate for air carrier operations is even lower.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1977).
1-5 Crosby, 746 P.2d at 1200.
-" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 305 (1990).
157 HAW. REV. STAT. § 263-5 (1991).
15

'8

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 360.012 (West 1991).

159N.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-7 (West 1991).
1- S.C. CODE ANN. § 55-3-60 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
161 Crosby, 746 P.2d at 1200.

-62ARAAD 1988 3 (1991); ARAAD 1986 3 (1988); ARAAD 1981 2 (1984);
ARAAD 1978 2 (1980); ARAAD 1976 2 (1976); ARAAD 1974 3 (1978); ARAAD
1973 2-3 (1975); ARAAD 1972 3 (1974); ARAAD 1970 11 (1974).
163

Rate of Carrier Accidents Reduced Sharply in 1980, 14

TECH., Jan. 26, 1981, at 80.
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Therefore, aviation is no longer just a pastime for a few
venturesome fools.
Next, state statutes that impose strict liability conflict
with state common law. New Jersey is one of the states
that hangs onto strict liability.' 64 However, under New
Jersey law, violations of the FARs are only evidence of
negligence. 165 Thus, if a pilot is the owner of the accident
aircraft, and the pilot violated a safety regulation contained in the FARs, then the pilot is not necessarily liable
in negligence for ignoring safety regulations, but definitely is liable under the strict liability statute. Presumably, the statute is in place because the state legislature
considers aircraft unsafe. Yet, when a pilot/owner violates a regulation enacted to increase safety, there is no
negligence as a matter of law. Because this conflict cannot be resolved, strict liability is not appropriate for pilot
negligence law.
Additionally, strict liability contravenes attribution theory. Pilot negligence rules should provide realistic and
achievable goals within the locus of control of pilots. In
contrast, strict liability targets individuals regardless of
whether the blameworthy agents were within the loci of
control of those individuals. Hence, strict liability offers
no incentives to eliminate negligent conduct.
To summarize, aviation strict liability is not a viable
legal principle. From any viewpoint, general aviation is
no longer an uncommon and hazardous activity. State
common law recognizes this fact, but statutory strict liability does not. Furthermore, strict liability contributes
nothing to the quest for greater safety, but tends the other
way, to keep aviation dangerous. Hence, it is an antiquated doctrine that needs a funeral.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Alterations to pilot negligence law are necessary to mirN.J. STAT. ANN. § 6:2-7 (West 1991).
165 Rodriguez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 739-40 (3d Cir. 1987).
16
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ror general aviation practice and to decrease accidents.
Pilot negligence law should retain negligence per se and
the standard of the ordinarily prudent pilot but in modified forms. Conversely, pilot negligence law should discard res ipsa loquitur, liability of instructors and check
airmen for the mistakes or poor judgment of other pilots,
and statutory strict liability.
It is clear that negligence per se should apply to all FARs
that concern the actual operation of aircraft. All operational regulations enhance safety. Greater safety means
fewer accidents and personal injuries. Pilot negligenceper
se should not, however, be limitless. The FARs rightfully
give the pilot in command the option to deviate from the
FARs in time of emergency. Also, a rule of strict construction should predominate. Overall, if everyone knows
and follows the FARs, flight safety benefits.
Likewise, pilot negligence per se should expand to encompass the AIM and advisory circulars. The AIM and
advisory circulars are terrific sources of prudent and approved safety practices. Moreover, they are potentially incorporated by reference into the FARs. Thus, the
expansion of negligence per se to these publications will
further increase safety.
Next, in any general aviation pilot negligence case, the
legal standard of care should be the ordinarily prudent
private pilot who has 500 hours total experience and 100
hours in type. Pilots having at least this level of skill are
substantially less prone to aircraft accidents. Beyond that,
this standard of care is precisely defined and is not so high
as to be out of the reach of most pilots. If all pilots were
to fly as well as the minimum standard, accident
probability would diminish.
Pilot skill notwithstanding, res ipsa loquitur is not an appropriate method of determining breach of duty. History
shows that aircraft accidents simply do not usually occur
as a. result of pilot negligence. Further, the FARs implicitly reject the doctrine by shouldering the pilot in command with the responsibility for the flight. In short, res
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ipsa loquitur does not fit within the realities of general aviation. Therefore, courts should dispose of the doctrine in
pilot negligence cases.
Similarly, pilot negligence law should abandon any concept of finding liability for the mistakes or poor judgment
of the accident pilot. First, the pilot should not be liable
in the absence of negligence. Moreover, flight instructors
and check airmen, who were outside the cockpit but nonetheless may be responsible for contributing to the pilot
error, cannot be liable. They have no control over the errant actions, cannot predict the future years distant and
cannot eliminate absentminded lapses by closer scrutiny
of students and applicants. The best solution to combat
mistakes and poor judgment is for pilots to pay attention
in the air. No alternate theory of liability will change that
duty.
Last, aviation strict liability is an anachronism. Aviation
has evolved from a pioneering adventure into a legitimate
instrument of travel and commerce. Evidently, it evolved
more quickly than the law. In addition, strict liability does
not promote flight safety because it is only a reaction to
all the miscues of pilots. The attribution theory hypothesis supposes that pilots can modify their behavior to avoid
accidents. In contrast, strict liability acts as a reactive
punishment, not a proactive motivator. As such, pilots
could well believe that exercise of the utmost care does
not prevent imposition of liability. Hence, no motivation
exists to associate care with nonliability. Consequently,
strict liability in pilot negligence law changes the results
of litigation but not pilots' attitudes regarding safety.
Finally, what went wrong in the 747 collision at Tenerife? During the six years preceding the incident, the captain of the departing aircraft worked principally as an
instructor in flight simulators. To save time and costs,
simulator controllers never instructed pilots to hold on
the runway. When the fateful time came, the captain did
not wait for his takeoff clearance. He performed with skill
and expertise, in a way he had practiced many times. Un-
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fortunately, his actions were not appropriate to the
66
situation. 1
The goals of pilots and the law include greater personal
safety in general aviation. Pilots achieve safety through
the wisdom of experience. Aviation has accrued a great
deal of experience over the past decades. Therefore, the
legal system would be wise to tap into it.
16 Reason, supra note 1, at 49.
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APPENDIX A: ACCIDENT DATA ANALYSIS
A substantial amount of information is available for
studying general aviation aircraft accidents. The NTSB
compiles and publishes data in statistical reports. I categorized the sources of error that result in general aviation
accidents and analyzed the statistical data in the hope of
discerning patterns or relationships among the accidents.
Also, I reduced data to study accidents as a function of
total hours flown by general aviation aircraft, accidents as
a function of overall pilot experience, accidents as a function of pilot experience with the make and model of the
accident aircraft, accidents as a function of the certification of the pilot and accidents as categorized by the causes
and factors contributing to those accidents. Although the
analyses are somewhat imperfect, they provide interesting
and important information.
NTSB accident data are very useful in the study of general aviation accidents. The NTSB publishes annual compilations of general aviation accident data. The reported
accidents include all those involving U.S. registered civil
67
aircraft not engaged in air carrier revenue operations.
An accident occurs when, as a result of the operation of
an aircraft, a person receives serious or fatal injuries, or
an aircraft receives substantial damage.' 6 Each annual
review contains various statistical data in tabular formats
for accidents occurring during that calendar year. Data
categories include kinds of aircraft, such as fixed or rotary
wing, and kinds of flying, such as personal or business, as
well as data for all operations.' 6 9 The reports also furnish
70
accident causes and contributing factors.
This study utilizes accident data from the twenty calendar years 1969 through 1988. There are several reasons
for using this block of years. First, 1988 is the most recent
published year. Next, twenty years is a substantial time
167

ARAAD 1985 1 (1987). This definition is typical of all the reports.
1985 58 (1991).

M6 ARAAD
169
170

See, e.g., ARAAD 1988 4 (1991).
See, e.g., id. at 61-72.
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interval; during those years, general aviation aircraft flew
over 628 million flight hours.' 7' Also, the NTSB changed
the standard definition of aircraft accident in 1968, making previous data incompatible. 172 Finally, the data from

year to year is very consistent. For instance, a total of
74,655 accidents occurred during the twenty year period.' 73 The average number of accidents per year is
3733, and the standard deviation is only 806.' 74 Likewise,

12,411 fatal accidents occurred during the period, yielding an average of 621 per year with a standard deviation
of 100.175 Hence, the years 1969 through 1988 comprise

an adequate group of data.
Unfortunately, not all of the data are usable all of the
time. The NTSB changed its reporting format several
times over the years, eliminating some forms of data and
adding others. As a result, some of the reports do not
provide the information required for this study. The consequence is that many of the specific analyses use only a
portion of the calendar years of the entire span. All adjustments made are detailed below.
Also, the statistics for each year contain some accidents
that are due to sabotage or attempted suicide. The per'7, ARAAD 1988 5 (1991); ARAAD 1987 5 (1989); ARAAD 1986 5 (1988);
ARAAD 1976 2 (1978); ARAAD 1974 3 (1976); ARAAD 1973 3 (1975); ARAAD
1972 3 (1974); ARAAD 1970 11 (1974).
172 ARAAD 1969 vii (1971).
173 ARAAD 1988 3 (1991); ARAAD 1986 3 (1988); ARAAD 1981 2 (1984);
ARAAD 1978 2 (1980); ARAAD 1976 2 (1978); ARAAD 1974 3 (1976); ARAAD
1973 3 (1975); ARAAD 1972 3 (1974); ARAAD 1970 11 (1974).
174 Standard deviation measures the dispersion of statistical samples about the
samples' arithmetic mean. Samples of similar data generally form a bell-shaped
"normal" curve of distributions about the mean. In such a case, 68% of the samples lie within one standard deviation of the mean, and 95% lie within two standard deviations of the mean. For more discussion of standard deviation, see OVID
W. ESHBACH & MOTr SOUDERS, HANDBOOK OF ENGINEERING FUNDAMENTALS 24547 (1975); HERMAN J. LOETHER & DONALD G. McTAvISH, DESCRIPTIVE AND INFERENTIAL STATISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 149-53 (1980); see infra Appendix B for the

calculation of the average numbers of accidents and standard deviation.
.71 ARAAD 1988 3 (1991); ARAAD 1986 3 (1988); ARAAD 1981 2 (1984);
ARAAD 1978 2 (1980); ARAAD 1976 2 (1978); ARAAD 1974 3 (1976); ARAAD
1973 3 (1975); ARAAD 1972 3 (1974); ARAAD 1970 I (1974); see infra Appendix
B for this calculation.
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centage of accidents due to suicide or sabotage, however,
is small. Since 1974, such acts account for only .035% of
the accident total.' 76 Hence, suicide and sabotage are not
sufficiently common to affect the analyses.
Where possible, this study focuses on accidents resulting in serious or fatal injuries. The NTSB utilizes four
categories of injury: fatal, serious, minor, and none.' 77
This is known as the accident's injury index and refers to
the most serious personal injury sustained in the- accident. 78 A fatal injury is an injury that results in death
within 30 days of the accident. 79 A serious injury is
[a]ny injury which 1) requires hospitalization for more
than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date
the injury was received; 2) results in a fracture of any bone
(except simple fractures of fingers, toes, or nose); 3) involves lacerations which cause severe hemorrhages, nerve,
muscle, or tendon damage; 4) involves injury to any internal organ; or 5) involves second- or third-degree bums, or
any burns affecting more than 5 percent of body
surface.' 80
This study does not use accidents involving only minor
injuries.
The first analysis studies all accidents involving general
aviation aircraft, utilizing data from all twenty calendar
years. Each annual report contains data on total hours
flown, total number of accidents total number of serious
accidents and total number of fatal accidents.'' For each
year, calculations determine the percentage of total accidents that are fatal accidents and the percentage of total
accidents that are either serious or fatal. In addition, calculations determine accident rates for total accidents, fatal
accidents and serious or fatal accidents. The accident
176 ARAAD 1988 18 (1991); ARAAD 1983 31 (1987); ARAAD 1979 23 (1981);
ARAAD 1975 15 (1977).
17 ARAAD 1988 21 (1991).
178 Id. at 58.

179 Id.
" Id. at 59.
1, See, e.g., id. at 3-5.
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rates are based on numbers of occurrences per 100,000
flight hours. 82 This analysis is useful in obtaining a
global view of the statistics and for discerning trends in
general aviation safety.
The next study analyzes the relation between aircraft
accidents and the total flight experience of the pilot in
command of the accident aircraft. This study uses data
from all compilations except 1971, which is not available.
It includes data for accidents of all types and data for all
fatal accidents. 8 3 The tabular format of the annual reviews presents numbers of accidents for pilots within certain ranges of experience,
for example, 0-50 hours, 508 4
on.1
so
and
100 hours
The experience intervals are not all the same size, but a
correction allows comparison of them. The number of accidents attributable to a given experience interval is divided by the number of fifty hour sub-intervals contained
in the experience interval. For example, the number of
accidents occurring in the 100-500 hour interval is divided by 8, because 500 minus 100 equals 400, and 400
divided by 50 equals 8. This correction assumes, of
course, that pilot experience levels and accidents are
evenly distributed within the intervals.
Also, the last experience interval, those pilots with
greater than 10,000 hours' experience, is not usable. The
interval is not bounded on its upper end. Thus, there is
no ascertainable number of fifty hour intervals to divide
into the number of accidents. However, the number of
accidents in this group, and probably the number of pilots, are small.
The total flight experience analysis has some limitations. First, it requires the assumption of even distribution of pilots and accidents throughout an experience
interval. Unfortunately, the NTSB data are not more il182 Accident rates are typically based on 100,000 flight hours. See, e.g., ARAAD
1988 4 (1991); see infra Appendix B for detailed data.
183 See, e.g., ARAAD 1988 30, 39 (1991).

18 See, e.g., id.
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lustrative. Second, the group of pilots with more than
10,000 hours is unbounded and hence unusable. Third,
there is no way to determine how many pilots are in any
given group of experience. Thus, it is impossible to determine what percentage of pilots in a group are involved
in accidents. Fourth, no data shows how much flight time
each group amasses during a given year, rendering the
calculation of accident rates impossible. Finally, the experience of the pilot in command for some accidents is unreported, so the data set is facially incomplete.
The data analysis also explores relations between aircraft accidents and time in type of the pilot in command. "85
'
Like the total experience analysis, data are
available for both total and fatal accidents but are more
limited. Fatal accident data are published for the years
1969 through 1979 only, and the last unbounded interval
begins at 3000 hours. Data on total accidents by time in
type are available for all the years except 1980 and 1981.
The more recent annual data are usable up to 10,000
hours. The data reduction is identical to the total experience analysis, except that the bounded intervals for the
earlier years end at 3000 hours. Consequently, this analysis has the same limitations as the accidents versus total
experience analysis.
Next is the analysis regarding aircraft accidents in terms
of the type of pilot certificate held by the pilot in command. Based on the FARs, the NTSB data sets recognize
seven discreet types of pilot certificate: student pilot, private pilot, commercial pilot, airline transport pilot, private
pilot and certified flight instructor, commercial pilot and
certified flight instructor, and airline transport pilot and
certified flight instructor.' 86 The annual data available for
this study runs from 1971 to 1979; no data are reported
after 1979; and the 1969 and 1970 data are not presented
in a comparable format.
The pilot certificate study has three limitations. First,
185 See,

e.g., id.

186See, e.g., ARAAD 1979 102 (1982).
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less than half of the twenty years of accident reviews are
usable. Second, the certificate of the pilot of the accident
aircraft is unknown in a small percentage of cases. Third,
the total numbers of pilots holding each type of certificate
are unknown and probably not ascertainable due to turnover of pilots from year to year. Hence, it is impossible to
determine the accident propensities of different types of
pilots.
The last analysis studies the types of pilot error that
caused or contributed to the accidents during the period.
The NTSB assigns to each accident probable causes and
8 7
contributing factors.1
The objective is to ascertain those cause and effect relationships in the accident sequence about which something
can be done to prevent recurrence of the type of accident
under consideration. Accordingly, for statistical purposes,
where two or more causes exist in an accident, each is recorded and no attempt is made to establish a primary
cause .... The term "factor" is used, in general, to denote
those elements of an accident that further explain or supplement the probable cause(s) ... .
For the years 1982 through 1986, the NTSB utilizes a detailed and comprehensive categorization of causes and
factors. 8 9 This categorization uses several echelons of
causes and factors, the major headings being aircraft, environment, human performance, and direct underlying
cause factors. 90
Regrettably, the other annual reports are not so useful.
Data before 1982 are reported in completely different and
unmanageable formats, and, after 1986, statistics on fatal
accidents are neither segregated from total accidents nor
separated in terms of pilot mistake or disregard. In contrast, the format of the 1982 through 1986 data allows an
analysis of causes and factors in serious and fatal acci187

188

See, e.g., ARRAD 1988 61-72 (1991).
ARAAD 1983 173 (1987).

189See, e.g., id. at 180-247.
190 Id.
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dents. Thus, for the years 1982 through 1986, the study
explores the prevalence of pilot negligence in accidents
resulting in serious or fatal injuries.
Extracting evidence of pilot negligence from causes and
factors is a substantial effort. The goal is to separate the
listed causes and factors into those that indicate pilot disregard from those that indicate poor judgment or mistakes. Pilot disregard of safe practices include those
causes that actually state that the pilot disregarded something. Also included are pilot tasks poorly performed on
the ground, such as flight planning, when the pilot has
plenty of time to do the task properly. Additionally, accidents that a pilot could avoid by canceling the flight altogether show pilot disregard, such as when the pilot takes
off into bad weather. Lastly, pilot disregard includes violations of the FARs. Overall, when deciding whether to
place a cause or factor in the pilot disregard set or not, I
tried to be as objective as possible.
Once the major separation is complete, data reduction
is similar to the other analyses. The first step is to determine, for those accidents in which at least one cause or
factor is attributed to human performance, the percentage
of fatal accidents that are due, at least in part, to pilot disregard. Then, by applying that percentage to the percentage of all fatal accidents blamed on pilot error, it is
possible to discern the percentage of all fatal accidents
that are arguably due to pilot negligence.
Although finding the prevalence of pilot negligence is a
significant result, the analysis is necessarily imprecise.
Each annual listing of human performance causes and factors is approximately fifty pages long and contains hundreds of subcategories of human error. Each of those
subcategories is either of the misjudgment class or the
disregard class. For many, it is difficult to determine the
proper classification because many subcategory descriptions are short, general, and not self-explanatory. Consequently, the results of this particular study are, at best, a
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gross estimate of the prevalence of pilot negligence in
general aviation accidents.
Overall, the NTSB data do not yield complete answers
to the questions relevant here, but are nevertheless illuminating. Information relating to total accidents and total
hours flown by general aviation aircraft is consistently
available. Information on accidents versus pilot total experience and experience in type is likewise available, but
restricted due to lack of data concerning the distribution
of the pilot population. Information regarding accidents
as a function of pilot certificate is similarly restricted. Finally, the most important analysis, that of measuring pilot
negligence in aircraft accidents, is really an educated
guess. Still, the NTSB data are the best available and do
provide answers to significant questions.
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APPENDIX B: ANNUAL ACCIDENT TOTALS

Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total
Average
s

Total Hours
Flown

Total Accidents

Total Accident
Rate/100k
Hours

25,350,675
26,030,414
25,512,000
26,974,000
30,048,000
32,474,608
34,164,993
36,127,631
31,578,000
34,887,000
38,641,000
36,402,000
36,803,000
32,095,000
31,048,000
31,510,000
30,590,000
29,318,000
29,208,000
29,634,000

4767
4712
4648
4256
4255
4425
4237
4193
4286
4494
3825
3597
3502
3233
3075
3010
2741
2581
2464
2354

18.80
18.10
18.22
15.77
14.16
13.63
12.40
11.61
13.57
12.88
9.90
9.88
9.52
10.07
9.90
9.55
8.96
8.80
8.44
7.94

628,396,321
31,419,816

s = standard deviation

74655
3732.75
806.21

11.88
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Total Fatal
Accidents

Fatal Accident
Rate/100k
Hours

Precent of
Total Accidents

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988

647
641
661
695
723
729
675
695
702
793
638
622
654
591
555
543
498
471
431
447

2.55
2.42
2.59
2.58
2.41
2.25
1.98
1.92
2.22
2.27
1.65
1.70
1.78
1.84
1.79
1.72
1.63
1.61
1.44
1.51

13.6
13.6
14.2
16.3
17.0
16.5
15.9
16.6
16.4
17.7
16.7
17.3
18.7
18.3
18.1
18.0
18.2
18.3
17.5
19.0

Total

12411
620.55
100.38

1.98

16.6

Year

Average
s
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Year

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Total
Average
s
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Total Serious
or Fatal
Accidents

Serious or
Fatal Rate/
100k Hours

Percent of
Total Accidents

1038
1029
1070
1081
1118
1161
1094
1117
1126
1251
1012
1022
1003
929
874
891
804
789
721
735

4.10
3.95
4.19
4.01
3.72
3.58
3.20
3.09
3.57
3.59
2.62
2.81
2.73
2.90
2.82
2.83
2.63
2.69
2.47
2.48

21.6
21.8
23.0
25.4
26.3
26.2
25.8
26.6
26.3
27.8
26.5
28.7
28.6
28.7
28.4
29.6
29.3
30.6
29.3
30.6

19865
993.25
148.41

3.16

26.6

